2007 Riley Fletcher Basic Municipal Law Seminar to be held in Austin:  The Eighth Annual Riley Fletcher Basic Municipal Law Seminar will be held in Austin on February 23, 2007.  Topics will include: (1) types of city government; (2) open government; (3) economic development; (4) ethics for city attorneys; (5) Tort Claims Act; (6) personnel; (7) municipal court; (8) purchasing; and (9) land use.  The seminar is great for new city attorneys or those wanting a refresher in the basics!  Seating is limited to 60 attendees, so don’t wait!  Please go to www.texascityattorneys.org for more information or to register.

Speakers Needed for TCAA’s 2007 South Padre Conference to be held on June 13-15, 2007:  Please submit your ideas by e-mail to shouston@tml.org by December 28, 2006.

Congratulations New TCAA Board Members:  (1) Diane Wetherbee, City Attorney, Plano; (2) Mary Kay Fischer, City Attorney, Corpus Christi; (3) Frank Garza, City Attorney, Balcones Heights, Poteet, Bulverde, Sabinal, and Terrell Hills; (4) Marcus Norris, City Attorney, Amarillo.  Also, special thanks to Jonathan Graham, City Attorney, Temple, for his past service on the TCAA Board

Congratulations Fall 2006 TCAA Awards Recipients:

• TCAA Honorary Lifetime Membership:  David Caylor, Former City Attorney, Irving

• Municipal Certifications:

  City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office
  City of Abilene City Attorney’s Office
  City of Baytown Legal Department
  Sharon E. Hicks, City Attorney, City of Abilene
  T. Daniel Santee, II, First Assistant City Attorney, City of Abilene
  Megan Robbins Santee, Assistant City Attorney, City of Abilene
  Thaddeus Afamu Iwuji, Assistant City Attorney, City of Abilene
  Ignacio Ramirez, Sr., City Attorney, City of Baytown
  Karen L. Horner, First Assistant City Attorney, City of Baytown

• TCAA Award for Excellence (Innovative Training Programs):  City of Plano Legal Department

TMCEC’s Fourteenth Annual Municipal Prosecutor Conference: The Texas Municipal Courts Education Center’s Fourteenth Annual Municipal Prosecutor Conference is designed for city attorneys and other attorneys who represent the State of Texas in the prosecution of state law and city ordinance violations that are punishable by the imposition of fines.  The curriculum addresses a wide range of procedural and substantive issues, and is designed to help government attorneys maintain professional competence in an ever-changing area of the law.  The program is approved for 12 hours of MCLE credit, including 3 hours of ethics. 

This seminar will be held on January 16-17, 2007, at the Omni South Park in Austin.  If there is sufficient response, TMCEC is planning to have a pre-conference event covering basic trial skills in municipal court. The pre-conference is approved for an additional 3 hours of MCLE credit, and is designed for attorneys with limited trial experience.  For more information, please visit:

http://www.tmcec.com/FY07/BrochurePros.pdf

Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Sovereign Immunity, Sara Kate Jancaitis, Strasburger and Price, Dallas:  For several years, Texas courts have distinguished between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from liability. Generally, immunity from suit prohibits lawsuits against a governmental entity unless the entity’s immunity has been waived. Immunity from liability, however, shields the entity from monetary judgments even if immunity from suit has been waived.  Sovereign immunity from suit may be waived by statute, by ordinances, or by other legislative enactments. Below is a discussion of recent Texas Supreme Court rulings which shed light on this issue.  Read more.

Elected Official:  Can I Talk About Public Business Outside of a Meeting?  Me:  Sure, If You Want to be Sent to Jail, Go Right Ahead!, Scott Houston, Texas Municipal League:  I usually don’t write in the first person.  As a lawyer, that’s not what I’m trained to do.  My job is to read statutes, court cases, attorney general opinions, and secondary sources, and to advise city officials in plain English what they can and can’t do.  In other words, I am an instrument that an elected official uses to conduct his or her duties in a lawful manner.  But I’m eminently frustrated when trying to advise elected officials about what behavior violates the Texas Open Meetings Act (Act).  Let me be more clear on that statement.  Read more.
 
Please e-mail any articles or news of interest to city attorneys to Scott Houston at legalgovt@tml.org.

Disability: City of Grapevine v. James B. Davis, No. 06-0318 in the Texas Supreme Court.  Amici argued that running is not a major life activity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and that the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas applies to a disability claim under the TCHRA.  The city's petition for review was filed on May 8, 2006, and a decision is pending.

Drainage Fees: Greater New Braunfels Home Builders Association, David Pfeuffer, Oakwood Estates Development Co., and Larry Koehler v. City of New Braunfels, No. 03-06-00241-CV in the Austin Court of Appeals. Amici argued thattheMunicipal Drainage Utility Systems Act (Act) is meant to grant cities additional means to establish and finance municipal drainage utility systems for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety from loss of life and property caused by surface water overflows, stagnation, and pollution.  The Act was never meant to preempt the authority of a home rule city to adopt other, legal development fees. 

Vested Rights:  City of San Antonio v. En Seguido, Ltd., No. 04-06-00206-CV in the San Antonio Court of Appeals.  TML and TCAA filed a letter brief as amici curiae, supporting the city’s position that a vague, one-lot plat filed in 1971 does not constitute the same “project” under Texas Local Government Code Chapter 245 as a currently-contemplated one hundred home subdivision, and therefore should not be allowed to maintain vested rights from that 1971 filing.

Note: Included cases are from the period beginning on the 10th of the previous month through the 10th of the current month.

Open Meetings Act:  Avinash Rangra, et al., v. Frank D. Brown, et. al., No. P-05-CV-075 (W.D. Tex., Nov. 7, 2006).  Rangra and Monclova, Alpine city councilmembers, sought a declaratory judgment that certain criminal provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act are unconstitutional as chilling free speech, and because they are vague and overbroad.  The district court held that the Texas Open Meetings Act provisions in question are constitutional because the speech at issue was uttered in the speaker’s capacity as a councilmember, and the Act’s provisions are neither overbroad nor vague. (Note:  See article above for additional discussion.)  

Personnel:      Terrell Bolton v. City of Dallas & Teodoro Benavides, No. 05-11141 (5th Cir. 2006).  Bolton appealed a summary judgment in favor of the City of Dallas alleging that he had a constitutionally-protected property interest in further employment with the Dallas Police Department.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s holding.  The court of appeals held that language in the City of Dallas charter that provided for the police chief’s continued employment at the rank and grade he held prior to his appointment if he is removed “not for any cause justifying dismissal” created a constitutionally-protected property interest.

Property Tax Foreclosure:    Jay Sandon Cooper v. Hamilton County, Hamilton Independent School District, City of Hamilton, and Hamilton Hospital District, No. 10-05-00315-CV (Tex. App.—Waco, October 18, 2006).  Hamilton County taxing entities brought suit for delinquent taxes against Cooper. Cooper filed cross-claims against other individuals for breach of warranty and fiduciary duty.  The Hamilton County suit was transferred to the Travis County Probate Court, which severed the tax foreclosure action from Cooper’s remaining causes of action.  The trial court held in favor of the taxing entities.  Cooper appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding.

Sovereign Immunity:  City of Waco v. Robert Earl Williams, Jr. et al., No. 10-06-00072-CV (Tex. App.—Waco, October 18, 2006).  The City of Waco filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the city’s plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the Tort Claims Act’s intentional-tort exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applies when police officers shock a person with tasers.  The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and dismissed the case against the city for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Note: On October 30, 2006, Chief Justice Gray issued another opinion on the above case citing his reasons as:

A judgment was entered in this case on October 18, 2006.  I agreed with the judgment but I did not join Justice Vance’s plurality opinion containing, as it does, much dicta and extraneous matter.  Historically, when the justices on this Court have split in three different directions, we have designated one opinion as “lead opinion,” designated the other opinion that agreed with the judgment as a “concurring opinion,” and designated the other opinion that did not agree with the judgment as a “dissenting opinion.”  Justice Vance refused to denominate his opinion as anything other than an “opinion” and contends that it is the opinion of the Court.  It is not.  In such a situation as this, where no opinion receives a majority of the votes of the justices on the Court, it is only a plurality opinion.  The parties were notified on October 19, 2006, that, contrary to the opinion dated October 18, 2006, I would issue an opinion in this appeal.  This opinion is intended to be “no longer than necessary to advise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic reasons for it.”  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.  City of Waco v. Robert Earl Williams, Jr. et al., No. 10-06-00072-CV at fn.1 (Tex App. – Waco, October 30, 2006). 

Eminent Domain: City of McKinney, Texas v. Eldorado Park, Ltd., No. 11-05-00259-CV (Tex. App.—Eastland, November 2, 2006).  The City of McKinney condemned property owned by Eldorado Park for drainage purposes.  Eldorado Park was awarded damages by the special commissioners appointed by the trial court.  The city appealed to the trial court and designated a new appraiser for the trial, who relied on a different drainage study.  Eldorado Park filed and was granted a plea to the jurisdiction based on the fact that the use of the new drainage study materially changed the issues from the commissioners’ hearing and deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.  The city appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial court’s grant of the plea to the jurisdiction because Section 21.018(a) of the Property Code provides for a trial de novo and does not prohibit the parties from changing expert witnesses or presenting new evidence.

Annexation: City of Port Isabel v. HP Pinnell, Trustee of Pinnell Trust, and the Town of South Padre Island, No.13-05-413-CV (Tex. App.—Edinburg, October 12, 2006).  In several successive ordinances, the City of Port Isabel annexed land in the Laguna Madre (the channel separating South Padre Island from the mainland) in order to annex land on the island that is north of the Town of South Padre Island.  The trial court held that the annexation ordinances were void ab initio, and that the Town of South Padre Island had standing to challenge all of the annexation ordinances (except one dealing with land neither in the Town’s ETJ nor affecting Pinnell’s property).  However, the court also refused to uphold the trial court’s injunction against the City of Port Isabel’s future enactment of similar annexation ordinances because those enactments would not, in and of themselves, cause irreparable harm, and therefore the court did not have standing to “invade the legislative functions” of the City of Port Isabel.

Civil Service: C.O. Bradford in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Houston Police Department and City of Houston v. Michel L. Pappillion, No. 14-04-00783-CV (Tex. App.—Houston, October 26, 2006).  The City of Houston appealed a summary judgment at the trial court level in favor of Michel Pappillion.  The summary judgment upheld an award to Pappillion by a civil service hearing examiner.  The city appealed the summary judgment on the grounds that the hearings examiner exceeded his authority by reversing a disciplinary sanction based on an erroneous interpretation of state law.  The court held that, because the hearing examiner’s decision was well within a reasonable interpretation of the statute in question, the city’s challenge failed.  The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Tort Claims Act:  City of San Antonio v. Jose Trevino, No. 04-05-00253-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, October 18, 2006).  Trevino sued the City of San Antonio for injuries and damages due to a car accident allegedly caused by a high-speed chase involving one of the city’s police officers.  The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the employee was entitled to official immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.  The court of appeals granted the city’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction because the city’s summary judgment evidence conclusively established that the officer was entitled to official immunity.   

Open Meetings Act:  City of Laredo v. Martha Escamilla, et. al., No. 04-05-00456-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, November 1, 2006).  Escamilla and others sued the City of Laredo for violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act, alleging that the city violated the Act when it had a closed meeting regarding a real estate transaction where: (1) the city could not show that open discussion of the sale would be detrimental to the transaction; and (2) the city did not provide sufficient public notice.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Escamilla and others, declaring the city’s vote to purchase the real property invalid and void.  The court of appeals affirmed.

Tort Claims Act:  City of San Antonio v. Grace Estrada, No. 04-06-00300-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, November 1, 2006).  Estrada sued the City of San Antonio, alleging that she was injured as a result of a “negligent activity” of a city employee as defined by the Texas Tort Claims Act.  While on a city firefighter’s shoulders, the two attempted to slide down the fire pole in a city fire station.  The trial court denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence was sufficient to show negligent activity under the Act. 

Probable Cause:  Edward Senter v. City of Dallas, No. 05-05-01416-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas, November 8, 2006).  Senter sought a hearing on probable cause after his truck was towed by the City of Dallas.  Senter challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the city’s probable cause to tow his truck, arguing that his truck was not “unattended” when it was towed, as required by the ordinance.  The trial court ruled against Senter, holding that the ordinance was being violated at the time the officer called the tow company.  In a memorandum opinion, the court of appeals affirmed.   

Tax exemptions:  City of San Antonio, acting by and through the City Public Services Board of San Antonio v. Bastrop Central Appraisal District and Appraisal Review Board for Bastrop County, No. 04-06-00300-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, November 1, 2006).  CPS Energy sued the Bastrop Appraisal District, which had obtained a district court order that CPS owes taxes on certain land because the land in question allegedly is no longer being used for a public purpose.  CPS argued that it was entitled to continue to receive a property tax exemption. The trial court denied CPS’s motion for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the appraisal district.  In a memorandum opinion, the court of appeals affirmed.       

Civil Service:  City of Harlingen v. Eddie Alvarez, No. 13-03-00169-CV (Tex. App.—Edinburg, November 16, 2006).  The court overruled the appellee’s motion for rehearing, holding that, while the 2005 amendment to Texas Local Government Code §143.036(a) clarified certain issues with civil service promotion, it could not have merely clarified a prior statutory definition of “vacancy,” because the term “vacancy” was not statutorily defined prior to the amendment.

Sovereign Immunity:  City of Houston v. Southern Electrical Services, Inc., No. 01-06-00015-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], December 7, 2006).  Southern Electrical Services, Inc. sued the City of Houston for breach of contract.  Houston argued that the words “sue and be sued” and “plead and be impleaded” in Houston’s charter and the Local Government Code do not waive governmental immunity.  The court of appeals agreed, but held that new Sections 271.151-271.160 in the Local Government Code waive immunity in contract cases and are retroactive.  The court of appeals remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.     

Insurance:  Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool, and City of The Colony, v. Brandon R. Burns, et al., No. 02-05-368-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, November 22, 2006).  An employee of The Colony sued TML IRP and the city for workers’ compensation benefits.  TML IRP argued that the trial court mistakenly held that TML IRP did not have standing to appeal the workers’ compensation decision.  The city argued that the trial court erred in dismissing its petition in intervention as untimely because there was misidentification of the parties.  The court of appeals held that there was no misidentification of the parties since TML IRP and the city cannot be viewed interchangeably as parties, and therefore the limitations period was not tolled.  The court of appeals also held that TML IRP did not have standing since it is not an insurance company.       

Civil Rights:  Phillip K. Poteet  v. Collin J. Sullivan, Henry Lucio, Byron Lake and Town of Flower Mound, No. 02-05-338-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, November 30, 2006).  Poteet sued the Town of Flower Mound and various police officers under § 1983 for civil rights violations because the officers performed a “civil standby”, which allowed Poteet’s ex-girlfriend to come to his house and take his belongings without allowing Poteet to intervene.  Flower Mound argued that it did not have a policy in place that was the “moving force” of any possible civil rights violations in the civil standby.  The court of appeals agreed, held that the town was not individually liable, and held that § 1983 does not allow for vicarious liability.  However, the court of appeals also held that there was sufficient evidence of a § 1983 claim to allow the suit to move past summary judgment on the issues of possible constitutional violations by the police officers.   

Tort Claims Act:  Crisha Pakdimounivong, et al.  v. City of Arlington, No. 02-05-414-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, November 30, 2006).  The plaintiff sued the City of Arlington for the death of Vattana Pakdimounivong when he was run over by two police cars.  When Vattana was in the back of a moving police car, he broke out the window and jumped from the car onto the highway.  He was subsequently run over by two following police cars.  The court of appeals held that the trial court was correct in granting the plea to the jurisdiction for the city because police work is a governmental function and the cause of the accident was Vattana’s erratic behavior, rather than the use of tangible personal property under the Tort Claims Act.  The court of appeals also held that the officers’ actions were not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for Vattana’s safety (even though the officer may not have buckled Vattana in).    

Tort Claims Act:  Malcolm J. Fox and Rebecca K. Fox v. City of Austin, No. 03-06-00172-CV (Tex. App.—Austin, December 1, 2006).  The Foxes sued the City of Austin when the city removed solid waste materials from their yard.  The city argued that trash removal is a governmental function under the Texas Tort Claims Act, and therefore the city is immune from suit.  The Foxes did not provide any evidence that the governmental activity of the city fit within any exception to immunity from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act.  The court of appeals held that the trial court appropriately granted the plea to the jurisdiction in the city’s favor, because sanitation is part of the list of governmental functions under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 101.0215, and because the Foxes provided no evidence that the activity fell under any exception to the Act.  

Annexation:  Olan Karm and Marc Payne v. City of Castroville, No. 04-05-00512-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, November 15, 2006).  The issues in this case are whether: (1) an annexation is void because the city failed to accept a petition for annexation of an area during the allowed time under Local Government Code Section 43.028; and (2) whether an annexed property owner has vested property rights under Chapters 43 and 245 of the Local Government Code.  The court of appeals held that the land was not properly annexed by the city because the city did not grant the landowner’s petition for voluntary annexation within the time required by Local Government Code Section 43.028.  The court did not rule on the other issues involving possible vested rights after annexation. 

Sovereign Immunity:  Paula Construction, Inc. v. City of Lytle and Hunter Associates Texas, Ltd., No. 04-05-00317-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, December 6, 2006).  This case was a grant of a motion for rehearing based on the Texas Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006).  Paula Construction sued the City of Lytle under a contract between the two parties.  The city argued that the wording of the Local Government Code regarding Type A cities’ ability to “sue and be sued” and similar language does not waive immunity from suit under Tooke.  The court of appeals held that, under new Texas Local Government Code Section 271.152, the city waived immunity from suit by entering into the contract, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Tort Claims Act:  Desiree Martinez v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-05-00775-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, December 6, 2006).  Martinez sued the City of San Antonio based on an attempted sexual assault by a convicted sex offender that she encountered at the Hispanic Research Center (during a gang violence project for the City of San Antonio).  Martinez admitted that she did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Texas Tort Claims Act because she believed the gang violence project was a proprietary function of the city, and therefore exempt from the Act.  The city argued that it was immune from suit because: (1) the project was law enforcement-based and therefore a governmental function under the Texas Tort Claims Act; and (2) Martinez failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Act.  The court of appeals agreed.   

Sovereign Immunity:  City of Dallas v. John Bargman, as trustee of the Ann T. Bovis Property Trust, No. 05-04-00316-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas, November 28, 2006).  Bargman sued the City of Dallas for trespass on a purportedly abandoned street easement.  The city filed a compulsory counterclaim for a suit to quiet title and a claim of breach of warranty.  The court of appeals held that the city had waived immunity for any suit that is connected with its counterclaim, up to any amount recovered by the city in the counterclaim, under the Supreme Court of Texas’ recent decision in Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006). 

Tort Claims Act:  City of Dallas v. Margaret Thompson, No. 05-0787 (Tex. December 1, 2006) (per curiam).  Thompson sued the city after falling over a coverplate at Dallas Love Field.  Thompson argued that the city was liable because its employees were near the coverplate and should have known it was a dangerous condition.  The court of appeals held that, because the city did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, the city was not liable as a premise owner under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 

Employment:  Jason Webb v. City of Dallas, No. 05-05-01621-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas, November 28, 2006).  Officer Webb was arrested and given deferred adjudication for family violence, and was later terminated by the City of Dallas.  Webb sued the city for reinstatement, arguing that the city had not given sufficient notice of the reasons for his termination, as required by ordinance.  The court of appeals held that the city did not give Webb sufficient notice under its ordinances, because the city stated at the termination hearing that he was being terminated for his conviction for family violence (even though he was never convicted of family violence), and only later argued that Webb was being terminated for pleading nolo contendere to the assault charge.  The court of appeals ordered reinstatement.

Annexation:    Karen Hall v. City of Bryan, No. 10-05-00417-CV (Tex. App.—Waco, November 29, 2006).  Hall filed suit against the City of Bryan for disannexation for failing to provide water and sewer lines and fire hydrants free of charge, and for failing to provide the annexed area with level of services, infrastructure, and infrastructure maintenance comparable to those available in other similar parts of the city.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the city. The appeals court affirmed the trial’s court ruling, holding that disannexation under Section 43.141(b) of the Local Government Code only applies if the city fails to “perform its obligations in accordance with the service plan” or fails to “perform in good faith.” 

Note: Included cases are from the period beginning on the 10th of the previous month through the 10th of the current month.

Opinion No. GA – 474 (Homestead Preservation Districts and Reinvestment Zones): concludes, among other things, that a city creating a homestead reinvestment zone is not authorized to establish a termination date for the zone. Additionally, a city and a participating county are not authorized to execute an agreement that requires the county to deposit its tax increments into the zone's tax increment fund for a period exceeding one year and under which the county does not have the right to annually reconsider its participation in the zone. Finally, the tax increment fund revenues may be used only to purchase real property, construct or rehabilitate housing units in the zone, and pay zone and housing-related administrative expenses.

Opinion No. GA – 477 (Open Meetings Act):  concludes that a city must give advance notice that it will consider the topic of a "personal endorsement" motion, and discusses the sufficiency of such notice.

Opinion No. GA – 478 (Annexation):  concludes that a type A general law city with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants is authorized to annex territory it does not own only if the territory is in the city's one-half mile extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Opinion No. GA – 479 (Driver’s License Suspension by Department of Public Safety):  concludes that Chapter 706 of the Texas Transportation Code, which permits a political subdivision to contract with the Texas Department of Public Safety to provide information necessary for the department to deny renewal of the driver's license of a person who fails to appear in court or fails to pay or satisfy a judgment ordering payment of a fine and costs, is not limited to traffic tickets. It is available for all offenses that arise in a municipal court. On the other hand, unlike the failure to pay fines and costs, the failure to appear system may not be used for offenses that arise in any other court.

Opinion No. GA – 480 (Use of Law Enforcement Vehicles):  concludes that a sheriff may authorize the sheriff's deputies to use county patrol vehicles for off-duty employment without reimbursing the county only if the predominant purpose is to conserve the peace within the county, the sheriff retains control over the vehicles in a manner that ensures the peace will be conserved, and the county actually receives this public benefit.

Opinion No. GA – 481 (Use of C.O. Proceeds):  concludes that a city may use the proceeds of tax and revenue certificates of obligation that are formally issued for "improvements to the City water and wastewater system" for any such improvements. Representations of an issuer's governing body outside the formal authorizing documents may limit the use of proceeds in certain circumstances.

Opinion No. GA – 482 (Development Fees):  concludes that a water rights fee imposed by the Public Utilities Board of the City of Brownsville solely for the costs of procuring a water supply and not for facility construction costs is not an impermissible impact fee prohibited by Chapter 395 of the Local Government Code.

Opinion No. GA – 483 (Dissolution of a City):  concludes that a city that is incorporated under general law and then reincorporated by special law becomes a special law city. If, between 1897 and 1925, the special law City of Millican's population was between 200 and 5,000 at the same time that the municipal offices had been vacant at least ten years, the city was dissolved under an amendment to article 397 of the Revised Civil Statutes that was effective during that same time period.

Opinion No. GA – 484 (Property Tax Rendition):  concludes that Section 22.01(k) of the Tax Code exempts cars and light trucks that are used in the course of the owner's occupation or profession as well as for personal purposes from rendition for taxation, but does not provide that such personal property is exempt from taxation.

Opinion No. GA – 485 (Government-Created Limited Partnerships – Tax Status):  concludes that, to qualify for a tax exemption under the Texas Constitution and Section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code, property must be both publicly-owned and used for public purposes. Property legally owned by a public-private limited partnership might nevertheless be equitably owned by the public entity, and thus tax exempt, when the public entity has the legal right to compel the transfer of title to itself.

Opinion No. GA – 490 (Tort Claims Act):  concludes that Texas courts would likely determine that a self-propelled golf cart that does not operate on stationary rails or tracks is a motor vehicle under section 101.051 of the Tort Claims Act. Similarly, Texas courts would likely determine that other "electric or motorized carts" that are self propelled and do not operate on stationary rails or tracks are motor vehicles.

You can view attorney general opinions at www.oag.state.tx.us . On the same site, you can also sign up to receive e-mail updates of opinion requests and newly-released opinions.

El Paso:  The El Paso City Attorney's Office has a vacancy for an attorney, licensed in Texas, with experience in municipal law (preferably land use).   The position will remain open until filled. Compensation:  Depending on experience.  For information or to apply, please contact:

Josie Hernandez
Office of the City Attorney
City of El Paso
2 Civic Center Plaza
El Paso, Texas  79901
915/541-4550
915/541-4710 (fax)
E-mail: hernandezJZ@elpastotexas.gov

Corpus Christi: Attorney I.  Analyzes and understands law, as well as materials on various subjects related to business of City. Advises client on the law informally, in person, or by telephone, and informally in writing in a timely and understandable fashion. Drafts documents pertaining to litigation, leases, contracts, ordinances, deeds, administrative law and other legal matters.  Reviews drafts for accuracy of content. Communicates about content of drafts in writing, or in person by telephone or E-mail.  May be assigned primary responsibility for major areas. Researches appropriate data and information on assigned project. Communicates with other staff or people involved and knowledgeable on the assigned projects.  Writes and reports assignment status to appropriate staff. Represents City in courtroom, bench, or jury trials and hearings, administrative proceedings, meetings, negotiations, and similar situations. Reviews, evaluates and prepares pertinent materials for court appearances.  Salary: $42,177.00
Must apply online at www.cctexas.com before December 17, 2006.

TCAA members may use the information herein for any purpose. No other person may reproduce, duplicate, or distribute any part of this document without the written authorization of the Texas City Attorneys Association.

Texas City Attorneys Association
1821 Rutherford Lane, Suite 400
Austin, Texas 78754
www.texascityattorneys.org